FOIR
Oscar Moya Lledó
23 Village Way, Beckenham, BR3 3NA, United Kingdom
DNI: 11820221S
Email: oscar.moya@cocoo.uk
18 July 2025
To: Ministerio de Transportes y Movilidad Sostenible
Paseo de la Castellana, 67
28071 Madrid, Spain
Email: informacion@transporte.gob.es
Subject: Freedom of Information Request under EU Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and Spanish Law 19/2013
Dear Sir or Madam,
Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, and Spain’s Law 19/2013 on Transparency, Access to Public Information, and Good Governance, I, Oscar Moya Lledó, hereby request access to specific documents held by the Ministry of Transport and Sustainable Mobility. If this letter does not reach the appropriate department, I kindly request that it be forwarded internally to the relevant authority, as mandated by EU law.
I request the following documents, justified by the overriding public interest in ensuring fair competition, regulatory compliance, and transparency in the European transport sector:
1. All correspondence (emails, letters, meeting minutes) between the Ministry and the European Commission from 2020 to 2025 regarding the implementation of the EU Mobility Package (Regulations (EU) 2020/1055, 2020/1056, 2020/1057), to clarify delays and non-compliance.
2. Reports or impact assessments from 2020 to 2025 on the economic effects of non-implementing the Mobility Package, particularly on haulage and logistics sectors.
3. Data on transport contracts awarded by Spanish public authorities to Eastern European firms from 2020 to 2025, including contract values and compliance records.
4. Beneficial ownership records of transport firms operating in Spain, particularly Eastern European firms, from 2020 to 2025, under 5AMLD requirements.
5. Sanctions or penalty records against transport firms in Spain for cabotage or wage violations from 2020 to 2025.
6. Council for Transparency and Good Governance resolutions on FOI denials related to transport policy or beneficial ownership from 2020 to 2025.
Additionally, I pose the following questions to clarify the Ministry’s actions and compliance:
1. What specific actions were taken to transpose Regulations (EU) 2020/1055, 2020/1056, and 2020/1057 by their respective deadlines, and why were these missed?
2. Which Eastern European transport firms received Spanish public contracts from 2020 to 2025, and what compliance checks were conducted?
3. What measures ensure beneficial ownership transparency for transport firms under 5AMLD, and what penalties were issued for non-compliance?
4. Are there records of sanctioned Eastern European transport firms operating in Spain, and what oversight was applied?
5. What internal assessments exist on the economic impact of Mobility Package non-compliance on UK hauliers and consumers?
6. How many FOI requests on transport policy or Mobility Package compliance were denied from 2020 to 2025, and why?
7. What steps address the European Commission’s 2024 infringement concerns, and what is the compliance timeline?
8. What data exists on the competitive impact of non-compliant Eastern European firms on Spanish transport markets from 2020 to 2025?
I request that responses be provided in English or Spanish, electronically via email to oscar.moya@cocoo.uk, within 15 working days, as stipulated by Regulation 1049/2001 and Law 19/2013. If access is refused, please provide detailed reasons per Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001 and Article 14 of Law 19/2013, noting that public interest in fair competition and regulatory compliance overrides commercial or privacy limitations.
Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya Lledó
DNI: 11820221S
AUTOPREGUNTAS
Of course. Based on a comprehensive review of our entire case history and all associated documents, I will now answer the strategic questions I previously formulated, providing a range of likely responses and identifying the most viable solutions for COCOO.
The first question we would pose to the public body—regarding their internal risk assessments on market distortion from the inconsistent application of EU law—would likely be met with a defensive posture. They might offer a range of answers, from claiming such documents are confidential, to giving vague assurances that they constantly monitor the market, to deflecting the question entirely. The most viable and likely outcome is that they cannot produce a specific, robust impact assessment that predates their decision and justifies their inaction, simply because one does not exist. Our solution is to leverage this absence. For our Unsolicited Proposal, we will frame this as a critical governance and risk-management gap that our services are uniquely designed to fill. For our media campaign, this void becomes a central theme: we will publicly question how such a significant and costly decision could have been made without a thorough, evidence-based analysis, thereby framing the issue as one of administrative negligence.
When we ask how they can assure EU bodies that Recovery and Resilience Funds are being used effectively within a broken logistics framework, their probable answer will be to draw a firm line between the two issues. They will insist that the auditing of specific EU-funded projects is entirely separate from the general enforcement of transport regulations. While procedurally correct, this answer is substantively weak. The most viable reality is that the operational efficiency of the entire sector directly impacts the economic return of any new investment. Our solution is to reject their narrow definition. We will argue that safeguarding taxpayer money requires not just financial accounting, but an assurance of market effectiveness. We will then position COCOO’s proposal as a necessary tool for them to demonstrate this deeper level of due diligence to the European Commission, making our engagement a matter of their own fiscal prudence and reputation within the EU.
In response to the question about their protocol for handling a mass dispute, the public body will almost certainly fall back on standard procedure, stating that their legal department handles all claims on a case-by-case basis. They will not admit to having a specific strategy for a multi-party, cross-border mass tort action of this nature. The viable outcome is the realisation that their standard process is utterly inadequate for this unique and complex threat, promising immense legal costs and years of fragmented litigation. This is the precise opening for our mediation proposal. Our solution is to present COCOO’s mediation framework as the only available, pre-designed protocol capable of resolving this dispute efficiently and globally. We are not just offering to mediate; we are offering them a lifeline out of a procedural and financial quagmire that they are unprepared for.
Finally, when we ask how they can fill the capability gap to resolve this complex problem, their public answer will be one of confidence in their internal teams. However, the private reality, and the most viable outcome, is that while they have skilled lawyers and economists, they lack the single most critical asset: our comprehensive, evidence-based understanding of the specific grievances and financial losses of the entire network of affected stakeholders. They have general expertise; we have the specific intelligence. Our solution is to acknowledge their internal capabilities respectfully, but to frame our Unsolicited Proposal as a one-time strategic partnership. We would propose a limited, low-value scoping study where we provide them with our unique dataset and stakeholder map. This allows them to save face by augmenting their internal team rather than admitting a complete failure, while providing us with a direct, defensible entry point to demonstrate our indispensable value.
AUTOPREGUNTAS
Based on our entire discussion and a comprehensive review of all materials, I will now address the strategic questions I formulated, providing a range of likely answers and identifying the most viable solutions for COCOO to pursue.
The first foundational question to the class of victims—whether they can produce specific evidence quantifying their losses since 2020—will likely be met with mixed but positive results. Some larger logistics firms will have sophisticated data analytics showing shifts in route profitability and contract losses. Smaller operators may only have anecdotal evidence. The most viable outcome is that we will gather a critical mass of hard data from a core group of claimants, which is sufficient to demonstrate a clear pattern of economic harm. Our solution, therefore, is to use this solid core of evidence as representative of the entire class in any legal action, and in our mediation proposal, we will present this data as a preliminary and conservative estimate of the total damages, creating a credible starting point for financial settlement negotiations.
The corresponding question to the public body perpetrator—can you provide the impact assessments for your decision not to implement the EU Mobility Package—will likely be met with evasion or the provision of vague, inadequate documentation. They are highly unlikely to produce a robust analysis that justifies their failure, as one probably does not exist. The most viable scenario is that their response will be procedurally weak. Our solution is twofold. In court, this becomes a cornerstone of a Judicial Review claim, arguing the decision was legally flawed due to procedural impropriety and a failure to consider relevant factors. For our mediation proposal and media campaign, this failure is gold. We will frame it as evidence of negligent governance, asking publicly, “Did the government fail to do its homework before making a decision that has cost UK and Spanish businesses millions?”
Moving to the strategic framing questions, when we ask the perpetrator how their failure to enforce fair competition rules differs from illegal state aid cases in the airline industry, the only possible answer is a complex legalistic denial. They will argue the situations are not analogous and that inaction does not constitute a state “measure.” However, this argument is weak in the face of the clear market-distorting effects. The most viable outcome is that their denial will lack conviction and appear purely defensive. Our solution is to aggressively push this analogy in all forums. In legal filings, we will cite the airline cases as persuasive precedent. In the media, we will simplify the narrative: “The government has effectively given a hidden subsidy to certain companies, creating an unfair advantage—just as they did for legacy airlines.” This makes a complex legal argument relatable and politically damaging.
When we ask how they can assure EU auditors that recovery funds are being used effectively within a broken regulatory framework, their only possible response is to claim the issues are separate. They will state that funding for new infrastructure is unrelated to the enforcement of rules for existing transport operations. This is a weak, bureaucratic answer. The most viable reality is that the two are deeply linked, as the efficiency of the entire transport network affects the return on any investment. Our solution is to make this link explicit. In our USP and mediation proposal, we will present COCOO as a partner capable of providing the assurance and monitoring frameworks that will satisfy EU bodies, directly linking our services to the safeguarding of valuable public funds. This positions us not as a critic, but as a necessary risk-mitigation partner.
Finally, addressing the resolution-oriented questions, when we ask the perpetrator if they have calculated their total liability from multiple lawsuits, their internal answer will be yes, and the figure will be alarmingly high. Publicly, they will not answer. The silence itself is the viable outcome. Our solution is to use this silence to our advantage. In our mediation proposal, we will present our own conservative calculation of their total exposure, framing our proposed global settlement as a cost-effective and certain alternative to an open-ended financial risk. When we ask the victims if they prefer lengthy litigation or a faster, holistic solution, the overwhelming answer will be the latter. Business owners want resolution and a return to fair market conditions. This allows us to confidently state in our mediation proposal that we are acting on the expressed desire of the affected class to find a constructive solution. It grants us the mandate to pursue mediation vigorously, not as a sign of weakness, but as the fulfillment of our stakeholders’ primary objective.
To begin, in preparing for a potential court action, we must ask foundational questions that solidify the evidence and the direct link between the harm and the perpetrator’s actions. For the class of victims, we would ask: Can you produce specific invoices, contracts, or internal reports from the period after 2020 that demonstrate a quantifiable increase in your logistical costs or a direct loss of business to competitors on routes involving Spain? For the secondary industries like agriculture, a key question would be: Do you have documented evidence of specific shipments that were delayed, spoiled, or rejected, and can you correlate these incidents with the period of regulatory non-enforcement? To the perpetrators, a public body for example, we would ask: Can you provide the minutes and impact assessments that were conducted prior to your decision not to fully implement the EU Mobility Package by the mandated deadline, and can you demonstrate how you balanced your legal obligations against other policy considerations? These questions are designed to build an undeniable, evidence-based chain of causation from their failure to our clients’ losses.
Next, we move to strategic questions that frame the legal and public narrative, making our case more powerful. Drawing on our analysis of the airline and automotive sectors, we would ask the perpetrator: How is your failure to enforce fair competition rules on the road fundamentally different from the illegal state aid identified in the European Commission’s actions against member states regarding their national airlines? Furthermore, considering the EU’s focus on the green transition under the NextGenerationEU funds, a critical question for a government department would be: How can you assure EU auditors that recovery funds allocated for sustainable transport are being used effectively when the foundational regulatory framework for fair and efficient logistics is demonstrably broken? For the court, these questions position the perpetrator’s actions not as an isolated administrative lapse, but as part of a pattern of behaviour that contravenes core principles of EU competition law and policy.
Finally, we transition to questions designed to pivot from confrontation to resolution, paving the way for our nomination as mediator. These are aimed at all parties. To the class of perpetrators, we would ask: Considering the significant, multi-industry financial losses we have evidenced, and the clear legal precedents in parallel transport sectors, have you calculated the total potential liability and reputational damage of facing multiple, fragmented lawsuits across several jurisdictions versus engaging in a single, comprehensive mediation process? To the class of victims, we would ask: Is your primary objective years of uncertain and costly litigation for a purely financial award, or is it to achieve a faster, more holistic solution that includes financial redress as well as the restoration of a fair, reliable, and competitive market for your future business?
The ultimate question, which we would pose subtly through our Unsolicited Proposal for Mediation, is directed at everyone: Given that one organisation has already mapped the complex legal arguments, quantified the multi-sectoral damages, and identified the key stakeholders on all sides, who else is better placed to facilitate a swift and efficient resolution to this entire dispute? This final question is not intended to be answered directly, but to lead all parties to the logical conclusion that engaging with COCOO as the official mediator is the most rational and cost-effective path forward.
Given the strategic decision to act as a neutral mediator, the previous approach must be fundamentally redrafted. The goal is no longer to secure a procurement contract through pressure, but to leverage that pressure to bring all parties to the negotiating table with COCOO as the indispensable facilitator. Here is the revised strategy and Unsolicited Proposal tailored for mediation.
Our campaign’s objective now shifts from creating a “procurement need” to creating a “mediation imperative.” The ongoing media campaign, highlighting the systemic unfairness and quantifiable economic losses across multiple industries, serves to demonstrate the escalating risk and cost of inaction to all parties. For the Spanish government, this means growing political and legal jeopardy. For the affected companies, it highlights the prospect of fragmented, expensive, and lengthy litigation to recover their losses. The aim is to make it clear to everyone involved that a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is vastly superior to a chaotic legal battle. Our campaign will frame the situation as a complex, multi-party dispute that cannot be solved bilaterally and requires a specialised, neutral facilitator.
Simultaneously, we must strategically pivot COCOO’s public position from a pure advocate to an “informed neutral.” The argument is subtle but crucial: through our exhaustive investigation, we have become the only entity that fully understands the complex web of grievances, the technical regulatory failings, and the specific economic damages from the perspective of all stakeholders. This unique, holistic knowledge is precisely what qualifies us to be an effective mediator. Our public interest mission is not to win for one side, but to restore market fairness and secure redress for all, which is the ultimate goal of a successful mediation.
With this environment established, the next step is to issue a formal “Mediation Proposal” – our new USP. This document will not be sent solely to the Spanish Ministry, but simultaneously to the key stakeholders we have identified: the leadership of the Spanish Ministry of Transport, relevant officials at the EU’s DG MOVE and DG COMP, and the legal departments and CEOs of the primary affected companies and trade associations in the UK and Spain, particularly in the transport, agriculture, and retail sectors.
This Mediation Proposal will be structured professionally. It will begin by outlining the significant legal and financial risks of continued dispute, referencing the precedents of costly litigation in the airline and automotive sectors. It will then formally propose a structured, multi-party mediation process with the explicit goal of achieving a binding global settlement agreement. The proposal will define COCOO’s role as the neutral mediator, justifying this by citing our unparalleled, evidence-based understanding of the entire conflict.
The core of the proposal will be a detailed “Mediation Framework.” This framework will suggest the scope of the negotiations, covering both a concrete and verifiable timeline for Spain’s full implementation of the Mobility Package and, crucially, the establishment of a financial settlement fund to compensate the various classes of claimants for past damages. It will outline a clear, multi-stage process, beginning with confidential bilateral discovery sessions with each party to consolidate the evidence, followed by joint negotiation sessions moderated by COCOO. The final deliverable of this process would be a comprehensive Settlement Agreement, drafted by us and signed by all parties, which would then be legally binding and avert all threatened litigation. The proposal will conclude by stating our readiness to host an initial exploratory meeting with all key parties to discuss and agree upon the terms of the mediation process itself.